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NOTES
THE FINALITY OF A JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF COMMON
PLEAS ON CERTIORARI TO A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
The 22d section of the act of March 20th, 1810, P. L. 208, 5 Sm. L. 161,
P. S. sec. 957, is the section which confers the privilege of removing any civil
case begun before a justice of the peace to the court of common pleas by a writ of
certiorari, but this section concludes with the proviso that "the judgment of the
court of common pleas shall be final on all proceedings removed! as aforesaid, by
the said court, and no writ of error shall issue thereon."
42

Numerous later statutes have extended the jurisdiction of justices of the peace
and the construction of these statutes by the courts of common pleas of the different
counties has been far from harmonious. It would be unfortunate if no authorita-
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tive construction could be had from the Superior Court because of the required
finality of the judgments of the different courts of common pleas.
Numerous cases hold that when statutes which create administrative agencies
confer upon a county court the right to hear appeals from the rulings of such
boards or agencies and provide that the action of that court shall be final, even if
its construction of the statute is erroneous, it is the final court of appeal. See Grime
v. Dept. bf Pub. Inst., 324 Pa. 371, at 378, in which, however, instead of quashing
the appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the court below.
In McGettigan's Liquor License Case, 131 S. C. 380, at page 286, Judge
Keller said:
"The effect of this provision of the statute will be to do away with
uniformity of decision on this important matter, for no court o quarter sessions is bound by the decision of another court of equal authority.
The decision may be persuasive but it is not of binding authority.
That, however, is a matter for the legislature, not for us. Our duty
is to follow the law as it is laid down for us."
See also Lithuanian Club Liquor License Case, 142 S. C. 556, in which the
appeal was dismissed.
What has been the effect of the provision in the Act of 1810 as to the finality
of the decisions of the courts of common pleas on certiorari to justices of the peace?
Paulson v. Eisenberg, 134 S. C. 503, involved this question, as well as the question
as to whether a justice has jurisdiction, under the provisions of the Motor Vehicle
Act, for damage to an automobile less than $100.00 in amount, when defendant's
automobile was operated by a third person in the absence of the defendant.
Judge Keller stated that the appeal would have had to be quashed if the
question had been as to the construction of the Act of 1814, the first act which
conferred jurisdiction upon justices in actions of trespass. This was said to be so
because the 4th section of that act, 42 P. S. sec. 667, provided that the proceedings
of the justices and the courts under the act should be in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1810.
In Crumley v. Crescent Coal Co., 13 S. C. 231, 236, it is said that the provision of sec 22 of the Act of 1810 applies only to the jurisdiction given by that
act "as extended by the act of 1879," but as the case was one for wages under the
act of 1810, the appeal was quashed. In Alexander & Co. v. Goldstein, 13 S. C.
518, the action was one of trover and it was held that the provision also applied to
proceedings under the act of 1814, as extended by the act of 1879, but not to
proceedings under any later act conferring a new jurisdiction. The appeal was
accordingly quashed.
In Yost v. Yost, 38 S. C. 464, and in Minogue v. Ashland Borough, 27 S. C.
506, in accordance with the decision in Cozens v. Dewees, 2 S. & R. 112, it was
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held that an appeal does not lie from the judgment of the court of common pleas
reversing on certiorari the judgment of a justice of the peace in an action of trespass, and the appeals wre quashed. In Phoenix Iron Works Co., v. Mullin, 25 S. C.
547, the common pleas had affirmed the judgment of a justice of the peace on
certiorari and again the appeal was quashed.
In Murdy v. McCutcheon, 95 Pa. 435, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the common pleas affirming the judgment of a justice of the peace but the
question as to the finality of the common pleas judgment was not discussed in the
opinion, probably because no motion to quash the appeal was made and the court
evidently overlooked the fact that the case fell within the statutory prohibition of
a second appeal.
In Fowler v. Eddy, 110 Pa. 117, the case arose under a section of the act of
1810 which did not authorize the entry of any judgment and the court held that

the judgment entered in such a case was not within
judgment of the common pleas is final. So also, as
arising under some act other than the acts of 1810,
lie from the decision of the common pleas. Ristau

the class of cases in which the
noted above, if the case is onL
1814. and 1879 an appeal will
v. Crew LLvick Co., 109 S. C.

357; Laska v. Zelazowski, 134 S. C. 311.

The finality of the judgment of the court of common pleas, when the case is
before it on certiorari, does not extend to its decision when the question of the scope
of the justice's jurisdiction arises on an appeal. Though the proceedings are then
de novo, the court of common pleas has no jurisdiction of a cause of action on appeal
unless the justice had jurisdiction of such causes of action, and the defendant on
appeal may demur to plaintiff's statement of claim, if it pleads a cause of action
not within a justice's jurisdiction. Knautt v. Massinger, 116 Super. 286.
The issue cannot be changed on appeal. The claim presented on
be the same as that sued before the justice, Bauman v. Bittner, 152
This fact has made it possible to secure appellate court construction of
to the subject matter of causes of action of which a justice may take
when this question arises on an appeal.

appeal must
Super. 628.
acts relating
jurisdiction,

It was thus learned for the first time in 1935 that the act of 1879, P. L. 194,
was to be interpreted as conferring jurisdiction on a justice to award damages for
personal injuries, if they are the direct and immediate result of force directly applied by the defendant, or by his servant in his presence. Knautt v. Massinger,
supra., and Paulson v. Eisenberg, 134 S. C. 503.

The case last mentioned decided that the only effect of the 30th section of
the Act of Junt 14th, 1923, P. L. 718 and its amendments was to permit the
service of process on a defendant, living outside of the county where the injury
was sustained, by deputizing the proper officer to make service in the county where
the defendant resides. It authorized the bringing of actions for damages arising
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from the use and operation of a motor vehicle in the county where the damages
were sustained but in suits in such counties brought before a justice, when service is
made by deputization, though not when the defendant is served in the county where
the action is brought, the action must not involve more than $100.00 and the
plaintiff must produce a receipted bill, sworn to by the party who made the repairs. The act did not confer any new jurisdiction on justices as to the cause of
action. This is still confined in auto accident cases, as in others, to damages the
immediate result of force directly applied. Nor did the act reduce the jurisdiction
to $100.00 unless the plaintiff had to resort to service by deputization. Only in
such cases is the act relevant.
Notwithstanding what has just been said, the Superior Court in a recent case
did take jurisdiction of an appeal from the judgment of the court of common pleas
on certiorari to an alderman. See Battles v. Nesbit, 149 S. C. 113. The action was
brought in the county of defendant's residence and srvice was made on his wife
at their dwelling house.
The justice's transcript showed that the action was "in trespass not exceeding
$300.00" This showed that the justice did not regard the $100.00 limit imposed
in actions under the act of 1923 as applicable and he was, of course, right. Plaintiff's attorney, however, not only proved the damages by plaintiff's testimony but
also by a sworn statement that the damages had been repaired and by exhibiting
a sworn receipted bill for the same.
This apparently led the Superior Court to say that the action was brought
under sec. 30 of the Vehicle Code of 1923, as reenacted in sec. 1208 of the Vehicle
Code of 1929. The amount of the judgment was less than $100.00, so that in this
aspect the justice was clearly within his jurisdiction. But the transcript did not
disclose that the trespass proven was of the kind as to which jurisdiction was conferred by the acts of 1814 and 1879. It was held that this might be presumed.
The judgment of the common pleas was affirmed. The appeal was not quashed.
No question was involved as to which the Vehicle Code had any relevancy. The
sole question was whether the transcript must show affirmatively that the justice
had jurisdiction of subject matter as well as of the person of the defendant.
"Special jurisdictions must contain on their face everything necessary to show
that they are not transcended." McGinnis v. Vernon, 67 Pa. 149, 152. It is
accordingly held that when certiorari issues to a justice of the peace, if the transcript
shows service of the writ outside the county of suit, then it must also show that
the cause of action arose in the county of suit and that a receipted bill for the repairs, properly sworn to, was produced. Emlenton Water Co. v. Kelly, 10 D. & C.
453 and Matthews v. Klepfer, 40 D. & C. 484. In the last mentioned case and in
DiCecco v. Spindler, 42 D. & C. 533 the same was held to bL true though in both
cases the writ was served in the county where the suit was brought. In both cases
the plaintiff relied on sworn, receipted bills served with the summons, thus showing

DICKINSON LAW1 REVIEW

that he thought he could do this in any auto accident case. They hold, however,
that in all actions of trespass the record must affirmatively show "the person by
whom and the manner in which the damages were caused."
In Burke v. Kleppinger, 30 D. & C. 285, it is said:
"It might be argued that there is a presumption that the cause of
action was for a type of trespass within an alderman's jurisdiction,
there being nothing in the record inconsistent with that theory, but
we find that that rule does not extend to questions of the justice's jurisdiction. We have found no appellate court case ruling this proposition either way, but there is a wealth of lower court cases decided by
eminent jurists whose authority demands respect, holding that since
the Act of 1887, a record must affirmatively show that the "trespass"
sued upon was the type of trespass cognizable by a justice: Fitzgerald
v. Campbell, 10 Pa. C. C. 396; Wood v. Bronson, 2 Dist. R. 746;
and other cases cited in 12 PS §2, note 2, and 42 PS §331, note 7.
Our record does not affirmatively show the nature of the trespass and
hence is faulty under these cases."
These cases were decided before the Superior Court had held that all trespass
actions are presumably of the type of which a justice has jurisdiction and that an
appeal is the defendant's remedy, if the contrary is the fact. The facts developed
on appeal then open the door to a statutory demurrer or to a compulsory non suit,
when they show a case which would have been trespass on the case at common law.
Certiorari, of course, can still be used when the transcript affirmatively discloses
that the case as proven before the justice was such a case, but this will not often
be the case.
It has been held that the Vehicle Code relates entirely to auto accident cases
in which the defendant is a non-resident of the county in which the action is
brought, so that resort has to be had to the service of process by deputization. If
scrvice is made in the county of suit, the amount of damages recoverable remains
$300.00. It is not reduced to $100.00 merely because it is an auto accident case.
Evidence of depreciation caused by the accident is as proper as is proof of the cost
of repairs. No sworn receipted bill is required. In short the act is irrelevant for
all purposes in such cases. Plaintiff can recover for personal injuries and/or for
damage to his car and, of course, the injured plaintiff need have no interest in the
damaged automobile. There may be several suits so long as each plaintiff does not
claim over $300.00 damages. So long as the transcript shows service of summons
within the county and that witnesses were sworn and testified, a judgment for the
plaintiff not exceeding $300.00 should not be reversed on certiorari. Battles v.
Nesbit, 149 S. C. 113.
The Superior
ment of the court
assumpsit, Clinger
which jurisdiction

Court has recently taken jurisdiction of an appeal from a judgof common pleas on certiorari to an alderman in an action of
v. Patterson, 140 S. C. 443. This is the very type of case as to
was conferred by the Act of 1810 and so certainly within the
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provision of that act giving finality to the common pleas judgment. Instead of
quashing the appeal, the court affirmed the judgment of the common pleas.
This case and the case of Battles v. Nesbit would appear to be cases like
Murdy v. McCutcheon, supra, in which the appeal was entertained because no
motion to quash was made and the court overlooked the fact that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
This raises the question as to the effect, if any, to be given to rules of law
enunciated in opinions written by appellate court judges in cases in which they
themselves say they have no jurisdiction. That, however, is another story.

THE REVIVAL OF JUDGMENTS
In Simmons v. Simmons, 346 Pa. 52 and 150 S.C. 393, and in Ellinger v.
Krach, 346 Pa. 52 and 150 S.C. 384, it was finally decided that when land, which
is subject to the lien of a judgment, is conveyed by a deed which is recorded within
five years from the entry of the judgment, the lien of the judgment binds the land
in the possession of the terre-tenant for a period of five years from the date of the
recording of the deed, even though the judgment is not subsequently revived against
the judgment debtor by scire facias within five years of the entry of the judgment.
The Supreme Court opinion was handed down on January 1st, 1943. On
May 28th, 1943, Act 325 was approved by the Governor. Section 4 of the act
provides that it became effective immediately upon final enactment. The full text
of the act appears in the advance sheets of District and County Reports of August
16th, 1943, at page 97a.
Section 3 of the act repeals the act of April 16th, 1849, P. L. 663, 12 P. S.
sLc. 872, which provided as follows:
"Inall cases when a judgment has been or shall be regularly revived
between the original parties, the period of five years, during which
the lien of the judgment continues, shall only commence to run in
favor of the terre-tenant from the time that he or she has placed their
deed on record: Provided, That this act shall not apply to any cases
which have been finally adjudicated, or when the terre-tenant is in
actual possession of the land bound by such judgment, by himself
or tenant.
The Supreme Court merely adopted "the judgment" of the Superior Court in
these cases and did not discuss the question involved. In the Superior Court Judge
Kenworthy and Judge Rhodes each wrote dissenting opinions. For other strong
criticism of these decisions, see 91 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 568 and 17 Temple Univ.
Law Quarterly 99.

